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HOLDING CREDIT REPORTING AGENCIES
ACCOUNTABLE:
HOW THE FINANCIAL CRISIS MAY BE
CONTRIBUTING TO IMPROVING
ACCURACY IN CREDIT REPORTING
DavidD. Schein

James D. Phillips
INTRODUCTION

A

outcome of the ongoing
and perhaps
critical, crisis
financial
has been overlooked,
the increasing emphasis being placed by
lenders on consumers' credit reports. Consumer credit reports are
utilized to compile credif scores like FICO' or Vantage, a more recent
credit-scoring service.2,2 Similarly, the significance of credit scores
has become a focus for many consumers due to the end of easy credit
that began in late 2007. Credit scores are used for mortgages, car
loans, credit cards, and other consumer credit, insurance, and
employment. The cost of a poor credit score, if credit is offered at
all, can be devastating. According to the Wall Street Journal,when
getting a car loan, a consumer with a high credit score could receive
an interest rate that is half the rate of a consumer with a scote 160
points lower. 3 Spread over millions of consumers, the impact of
credit reports on credit scores justifies an examination of the legal

Assistant Professor, Virginia State University.
Associate Professor, Virginia State University.
'Study Finds Little Impact to Most Consumers' FICO Credit Scores When
Lenders Lower Spending- Limits on Credit Cards. (Aug. 20, 2009),
http://www.fico.com/en/Company/News/Pages/08-20-2009.aspx.
2 Vantage Score Solutions President/CEO Barrett Burns' Congressional
Testimony on Credit Scoring, ENHANCED ONLINE NEWS (Mar. 24, 2010),
http://eon.businesswire.com/news/eon/20100324006607/en.
3 Karen Blumenthal, How to Wreck Your Credit Score, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9,
2011, at B8.

329

330

Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

[Vol. 24:3

exposure for the credit reporting agencies ("CRAs") that provide
these credit reports.
This article examines the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") 4
the FCRA's amendments included in the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003 ("FACT Act"),5 and how the courts have
interpreted the FCRA in response to consumers moving against the
CRAs for sending out inaccurate credit information or failing to
correct inaccurate credit information. The Consumer Credit
Reporting Reform Act of 1996 ("CCRA") 6 is also discussed, because
it added two important tools for consumers: the availability of
statutory damages and the requirement that deleted information
cannot be reinserted into the credit report without notice and
verification.'
The article then discusses important judicial decisions. It
focuses on the decisions of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals,
interprets these statutes, and concludes with a discussion of the status
of the potential legal liability of CRAs.
I. COMMON LAW AND EARLY AMERICAN DOCTRINE
With its adoption on April 25, 1971, the FCRA provided
some relief for consumers who can prove an injury caused by false or
inaccurate credit reports. To fully appreciate the purpose and
significance of the FCRA and its amendments, it is instructive to
examine the legal landscape that existed prior to the FCRA and its
amendments. 8
At common law, credit bureaus had extremely limited
responsibility for reporting errors, and when sued for defamation, a
bureau was able to raise the defense of conditional privilbge.9 The
4 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. 90-321, 91-508, 84 Stat. 1129 (1970)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1681a-1681x).
5 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117
Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§
1681a-1681x).
6 Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a168 1x).
7 Gary Allen Gardner, The Fair Credit Reporting Act: Implicationsfor 1999
and Beyond, 78 MICH. B.J. 298, 299-301 (1999) (recounting the changes to the
FCRA instituted by the CCRA).
8 See G. Allan Van Fleet, Judicial Construction of The Fair Credit Reporting
Act: Scope and Civility, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459-466 (1976) (reviewing the
common-law shortcomings that eventually prompted legislative action).
9 Charles M. Ullman, Liability of Credit Bureaus After the Fair Credit
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common law provided no real remedy for false credit reporting, but
sowed the seeds for today's option to hold credit reporting agencies
accountable.
An English case, Toogood v. Spyring,'0 is one of the early
decisions that set forth the idea that communication by an employer
about an employee might be conditionally privileged if published
The
during the conduct of his affairs or in his own interest."
Toogood theory, which would be followed in an early line of cases,
was that the plaintiff could proceed under an action for defamation
and its resulting damage to his commercial standing.12 The decision
established an obviously broad standard, but the case further held that
the plaintiff would have to show actual malice in order to recover.
This standard led to other early decisions that held that the publisher
of defamatory information first must be under a duty or interest
before the conditional privilege could be successfully claimed. 14
Subsequently, two other British Commonwealth cases applied
the defense of conditional privilege announced in Toogood. In the
decision of Robinson v. Dun,'5 the court accepted the theory of
conditional privilege, but clarified that in order to enjoy the
protection, the publisher must be under a duty to convey the
offending statement. 16 In MacIntosh v. Dun,'7 an Australian case
decided by the Privy Council, the court held that the credit bureau
was not under a duty to report the information, but rather was under
the sole motive of generating a profit and therefore not able to assert
the privilege articulated in Toogood.'
These cases provided the foundations for the early legal
standards in the United States. In addition to the defamation theory,
the developing concept of an individual's right to privacy was an
additional rationale available for holding reporting agencies
accountable.' 9 The term right to privacy was first coined by Samuel

ReportingAct: The Need For FurtherReform, 17 VIL. L. REv. 44, 44-45 (1972).
'o (1834) 149 Eng. Rep. 1044 (H.L).
It

Id. at 1050.

12 Id. at

1045.
1050.
14 Ullman, supra note 9,
at 45-46.
15 Id. at 46 & nn. 18-20 (discussing Robinson v. Dunn, 24 O.A.R. 287,
293
(1897)).
13 Id. at

16

Id.

[1908] A.C. 390 (P.C.) (Austl.); Ullman, supra note 9, at 46-47 & n.21.
Ullman, supra note 9, at 46-47.
19Van Fleet, supra note 8, at 462.
17
18
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Warren and Louis Brandeis in their article "The Right to Privacy," 20
and emerged as a legal theory used by plaintiffs attempting to hold
parties responsible for a wide range of putative claims.21 Using a
privacy theory was an attractive course of action for plaintiffs. Their
success would not turn on whether the reported information was true,
but rather, whether that the offending act, compiling and publishing
personal financial data, was an intrusion into one's private life. 22
Even with the existence of these common-law theories, courts
were reluctant to hold reporting agencies liable for investigating or
23
One basis for this reticence
reporting consumer's credit histories.
was the issue of publication.24 Because the successful actions for the
publication of private facts were traditionally based on unreasonable
public exposure, courts seemingly were unwilling to find the
necessary element of publication in a communication of a single
credit report to a single subscriber.2 5
In addition to courts' declining to hold credit agencies
accountable for consumer credit reporting abuses, the reporting
agencies more importantly escaped legislative oversight for most of
the twentieth century. In 1916, Oklahoma was the first state to pass
any real legislative controls over reporting agencies 2 6 later followed
by Massachusetts,27 New MexiCO28 and New York. 29 Accordingly, at
the time FCRA was introduced in Congress-with the exception of
these four state statutes-there was little protection for the consumer
against the credit bureaus reporting inaccurate credit information.30

Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 193 (1890).
21 Van Fleet, supra note 8,
at 462-63.
22 See McKinzie v. Huckaby, 112 F. Supp. 642, 645
(W.D. Okla. 1952)
(holding that truth is no defense in an action for invasion of privacy).
23 Van Fleet, supra note 8,
at 462-63.
20

24 Id.

Id.; see, e.g., Peacock v. Retail Credit Co., 302 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga.
1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1970).
26 OKLA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 81-86
(1910).
27 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, §§ 44-46 (renumbered as MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch.
93, §§ 50, 52, 56-59, 62) (1971).
28 N.M. STAT. §§ 50-18-1 through -18-6 (renumbered as N.M.
STAT. §§ 56-3-1
through -7) (1953).
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 370-76 (expired and recodified as amended at N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 380-a through 380-u) (1977).
30 Van Fleet, supra note 8,
at 464-65.
25
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II. THE FAI CREDIT REPORTING ACT OF 1970 AND ITS
AMENDMENTS
The general intent of FCRA is to provide protection to the
consumer by expanding the CRAs' potential liability beyond that
which existed at common law. The FCRA holds CRAs liable for
negligent 3 or willful violations of the statute32 with respect to
preparing and reporting consumer credit information, provided that
actual damages can be proven. Negligence may be found where there
is a failure to adopt reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of
the reports or where there is a failure to prevent the reports from
being disclosed to unauthorized recipients. 33 The plaintiff has the
burden to show, by the preponderance of the evidence, that
reasonable procedures were not followed rests with the plaintiff.34 In
addition to actual dama es, the FCRA allows for recovery of
attorneys' fees and costs, 3 as well as punitive damages if willfulness
is proven.36 In addition, a violation of the FCRA is considered to be
a deceptive or unfair trade practice that can be enforced by the
Federal Trade Commission. 37
The FCRA is limited in scope and affects only certain CRAs,
typically those operating for fees, and regulates those CRAs only to
the extent that the bureaus report on individuals. 3 8 Pa.tnerships,
corporations, trusts, estates, cooperatives, associations and other legal
entities were left to seek protection under state law. 39
The FCRA also creates a system of due process, whereby the
consumer may learn of adverse reports, discover the information
contained therein, and be able to correct or supplement false or
misleading information.40 This system's features include:
15 U.S.C. § 1681o (2006).
Id. § 1681n.
3 See id. § 168 lo(a) (stating that any violation of this chapter is actionable);
see also id § 168 1b (enumerating permissible recipients and uses of reports); id. §
1681 e(b) (requiring "maximum possible accuracy" for reports).
34 See id. § 168 1n(a)(1)(A); see also Ashby v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Or., 592 F.
Supp. 2d 1307, 1310 (D. Or. 2008) (holding that "[p]laintiffs' burden-of-proof
instruction ["plaintiffs bear the burden to prove their claim for damages under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act by a preponderance of the evidence"] is a correct
statement of the law").
31

32

3 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.
Id. § 1681n(a)(1)(B)(2).
Id. § 1681s(a).
3 Ullman, supra note 9, at 59.
39 Id. at 59-60.
40

Van Fleet, supra note 8, at 466.
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1. Whenever credit is denied for personal, family or
insurance purposes, or the cost of credit or insurance is
increased as the result of a consumer report, the CRA
must advise the consumer as well as provide the name,
address and phone number of the CRA.
2. The CRA must notify the consumer within 3 days of
anyone who requests the CRA to generate an
investigative report concerning his reputation.
3. After receiving notice of an adverse action, the
consumer can obtain the "nature" and "substance" of
the information in his file and the recipients to which
the reports have been sent.
4. If the consumer objects to the information as false and
misleading, he may request a reinvestigation, and may
have a brief statement inserted in the report for future
investigations.
5. The consumer may also cause the brief statement to be
sent to those who received the original report.41
Moreover, the FCRA also attempts to protect consumers by
requiring reform in the operating procedures of both the CRAs and
their users. For example, CRAs are required to have procedures to
avoid the reporting of outdated information,4 2 avoid furnishing
reports to unauthorized users,4 3 and ensure the maximum level of
accuracy in reporting consumer-credit information. 44 While the
FCRA was the first step in providing the consumer some redress
from the damage resulting from obsolete, inaccurate, and misleading
information in their credit reports, it was also criticized as "awkward,
uncertain and owing to industry influence" and as not enough help to
the consumer. 45
Since its inception, the FCRA provided the ground rules for
resolving consumer disputes about errors in their credit scores. The
CCRA later amended FCRA in several ways beneficial to
consumers.46 Statutory damages became available for consumers
41

Id. at 467.

15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
43Id. § 1681e(a).
'"Id. § 1681e(b).
42

45
46

Van Fleet, supra note 8, at 507.
Gardner, supra note 7, at 298-301.
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against "any person who willfully fails to comply with any
requirements . . . with respect to any consumer."4 7 Actual damages,

which miht be greater, are also recoverable, 48 as are punitive
damages, costs, and attorneys' fees.so With these statutory damages
and the availability of costs and attorneys' fees, an individual
consumer could privately enforce the law and define specific
obligations of the CRAs. 5'
The CCRA also extended civil liability to any entity or person
which willfully violates FCRA, including creditors. 52 Creditors can
be found to be in violation of FCRA after failing to properly conduct
or cooperate with a reinvestigation.5 3 Once the creditor has been
advised that the account was either improperly established or
contains erroneous information, the creditor ma' be held liable for
failing to document or support a published report. 4
The 1996 amendments also address the reinsertion of
Before the amendments, the
previously deleted information.
consumer may have worked her way through the dispute process,
have erroneous material removed from her file, only to have the
creditor report the same information again, 30, 60 or 90 days later to
Unless the consumer continually reviewed the reports,
the CRA.
there would be no suspicion that the erroneous information had been
re-reported.57
The CCRA, therefore, imposed affirmative duties on CRAs to
notify the consumer if previously deleted information reappeared in a
consumer's credit file and to maintain a system to prevent the
reappearance of information and data that had been previously
deleted.
If any information was deleted because of a dispute,
inaccuracy, incompleteness, or lack of verification, the consumer
must be notified in writing if the information is later reinserted into
his or her portfolio.5 9 Before such information could be reinserted, it
15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
§ 1681n(a)(1)(A).
49 Id. § 1681n(a)(2).
' 0 Id. § 1681n(a)(3).
47

48 Id.

Gardner, supra note 7, at 299.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681i.
5 Id. § 1681i(a); see also Gardner,supra note 7, at 300.
54 Gardner, supra note 7, at 300.
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(B).
56 Gardner, supra note 7, at 300.
SId.
5

52

58

59

15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(B).
Id. § 1681i(a)(5)(B).
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must have been verified by the furnisher as "complete and
accurate." 60
One other feature of the CCRA bears mention. Recognizing
that a substantial part of the consumer-reporting process crosses state
lines and is national in scope, Congress included provisions in the
amendments that explicitly preempt state laws in certain critical
areas, including: prescreening, the process whereby the creditor
provides credit requirements to a CRA and requests a list of
consumers who meet them; reinvestigation time frames; and
information contained in consumer reports.61 As part of the political
compromise to pass the bill, these preemption provisions were
scheduled to sunset January 1, 2004.V2 Preventing these sunset
provisions became a key motivation to amend the FCRA again.
In December 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law
the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, the FACT Act.63 in
addition to keeping the preemption provisions of the CCRA
permanent and expanding preemption requirements to other areas, the
FACT Act imposed new obligations on CRAs, in addition to banks,
retailers, insurance companies and others. It became the latest in the
legislative enactments which attempted to protect consumers and
increase their access to credit. The following is a brief overview of
the changes Congress made to the FCRA in 2003.
The FACT Act includes a number of sections which attempt
to prevent identity theft. When a consumer believes that he has been
or is about to be a victim of identity theft, he may request a CRA to
place in his portfolio an initial fraud alert.64 This alert must remain in
the consumer's file for at least 90 days, and anyone rec1uesting the
consumer's report is required to receive the alert as well.6 Moreover
if the consumer has already been a victim of identity theft, he may
include in his file an extended fraud alert after taking certain steps,
including filing an identity-theft report with a law-enforcement
agency and providing it to the CRA.6 6 This extended alert must
remain in the consumer's file for seven years and must be included in

Id. § 1681i(a)(5)(B)(i).
U.S.C. § 1681t(b).

60

6115

'Id. § 1681t(b).

Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159,
117 Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§
168la-1681x).
6 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1(a)(1).
63

6

1Id.

66

§ 1681c-1(a)(1).
Id. § 1681c-1(b)(1).
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the consumer's credit report. 67
In addition to its preventative measures, the FACT Act
provides the consumer with tools to correct the identity-theft
problems by allowing the consumer to halt a CRA from including in
her file information that resulted in the identity breach. 68 Under the
tradeline-blocking provision 69 the consumer may prevent certain
information from being included in their file by providing certain
documents to the CRA, including the identity-theft report and the
information to be blocked. 70 The CRA, thereupon, is required to
block the publication of this information within four business days
and to give notice of the block to the data furnisher,7 ' and the data
furnisher is required to maintain procedures to prevent the further
These measures
publication of that information to other CRAs.
greatly enhanced the consumer's ability to police the contents of their
credit reports and have meaningful methods of protecting the
integrity of their files.73
The FACT Act also increases the responsibilities of data
furnishers with regard to the accuracy of information provided to
CRAs.74 Accordingly, it directs the federal banking agencies, the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), and others to establish
guidelines for data furnishers to ensure the integrity . of the
documentation provided to the CRAs.7 s Also, a data furnisher may
not publish information to a CRA if it knows or reasonably believes
the information to be inaccurate.76 This addresses the accuracy of the
credit report on the front-end of the process, at the time the data is
reported and complements the tools provided to the consumer to
police and correct information on the back-end.
Another major tenet of the FACT Act is to provide the
§ 1681c-1(b)(1)(A).
Id. § 168 1c-2(a).
69 See 2003 Changes to the Fair Credit Reporting Act: Important Steps
Forward
at
a
High
Cost,
CONSUMERSUNION.ORG
(2009),
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/corefinancialservices/000745.html
(discussing specific provisions of the Fair and Accurate Credit Reporting Act of
2003, including the tradeline blocking provision).
7o 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(a)(2)--(3).
7' Id. § 1681c-2(a)-(b).
72 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(6)(A).
7 See generally Michael F. McEneney & Karl F. Kaufmann, Implementing the
FACTAct: Self-Executing Provisions,60 BUS. LAW. 737 (Feb. 2005).
- 74 See id. § 1681s-2(e)(1)(A) (requiring guidelines to be established and
maintained for persons furnishing information to credit reporting agencies).
7 Id.
76 Id. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A).
67 Id.
6
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consumer easier access to his credit history. To accomplish this goal,
national and other CRAs must provide to each consumer, upon
request, disclosure of his credit history at least once per year for
free.7 7 Also, the consumer must be notified if a consumer report is
used to make a credit decision "on material terms that are materially
less favorable than the most favorable terms available to a substantial
portion of consumers."78 The notice must advise the consumer that
the terms of credit offered are set based on data from a consumer
report, identify the CRA that provided the report, include a statement
that the consumer may secure a copy of the report from the CRA
without paying a fee.7 9
Finally, the FACT Act provides for disclosures to consumers
in connection with the use of their credit scores.80 In essence, certain
CRAs are required to disclose, upon request, either the score that is
derived from a credit scoring model in connection with residential
real property loans or a more generic score designed to assist the
consumer in better understanding the assessment of his credit
behavior.8 Additionally, those who make or arrange home loans
based on credit scores are also required to furnish the consumer's
credit score to him.82
As discussed above, the FCRA, and the amendments thereto,
have expanded the protections beyond the common law to consumers
who desire to ensure their credit is in good standing and available to
them when they want to purchase a home or other large item. In the
wake of the financial crisis, beginning in late 2008 the value of an
accurate and authentic credit report has increased. Banks are making
fewer loans, usually to consumers with clean credit histories. Related
to this consequence is the consumer's ability to regularly have access
to his credit report and require that the mandates of the FCRA be
followed. Of course the ultimate consequence of the FCRA and its
amendments depends on how the courts have interpreted and
enforced the Act.

nId. §
Id. §
7 Id. §
s0 d. §
8' Id. §
82 Id. §

1681j(a)(1)(A).
1681m(h)(1).
1681m(h)(5).
1681g.
1681g(f)(7)(A).
1681g(g)(1)(A)(i).
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III. CREDIT BUREAU LITIGATION
A. General Overview
The advent of information sharing over the internet, the recent
lending and mortgage crisis, and the rise in popularity and
proliferation of advertisements from independent credit bureaus such
as Consumerinfo.com, which promotes Freecreditscore.com and
Freecreditreport.com, has led to a sharp rise in CRA litigation." The
case In re FCRA Litigation seeks class action status for consumers in
several states who have claimed that credit bureaus are intentionally
confusing customers, engaging in false advertising, and not ving
consumers what they pay for when they sign up for services. For
example, Consumerinfo.com, the subject of the suit in U.S. District
Court in California, is alleged to have advertised and sold credit
scores that were represented to be the credit scores used by lenders,
but was actually a score they created. 85 The voluminous nature of the
class action, as well as the underlying theory of liability, portend a
growing tide of litigation for CRAs.
While the recent Consumerinfo.com suit and others show the
relationship between credit bureau publicity and the increase in
litigation over false or irresponsible reporting, litigation and the
general principles behind FCRA suits have been well established in
prior years. Though as the following survey reveals, the courts in
many federal circuits take distinct approaches to FCRA cases.
First Circuit
In DeAndrade v. Trans Union LLC et al.,8 6 the First Circuit
held that a CRA could not be held liable-either under the FCRA or
any other theory-for its alleged failure to reinvestigate properly and
delete the disputed debt from the plaintiffs credit history. In that
case, the lending bank that reported the repayment controversy to the
See Heins Mills

& Olson, P.L.C.: Class Action Filed Against
Consumerinfo.com,
Inc.,
PRNEWSWIRE.COM
(Mar.
23,
2011),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/heins-mills--olson-plc-class-actionfiled-against-consumerinfocom-ine-118531409.html; see also In re Pub. Recs.
Collection FCRA Litig., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1382 (J.P.M.L. 2009).
84 In re Pub. Recs. Collection FCRA Litig., 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1382; see also,
e.g., Marricone v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 09-CV-ll23, 2009 WL
3245417 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2009).
85 Heins Mills & Olson, P.L.C., supra
note 82.
86 DeAndrade v. Trans Union LLC, 523 F.3d 61 (1st
Cir. 2008).
83
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CRAs, Trans Union and Equifax, caused the CRAs to update the
plaintiffs credit report with negative information.8 7 When the
plaintiff wrote a letter to the CRAs explaining the misinformation
sent to them by the lending bank, both of the defendants failed to
update his credit report accordingly. The plaintiff argued that the
failure to update and correct the credit report constituted a substantial
injury to him and caused him to be unable to refinance his home. 89
The court determined that the information given to the CRAs
by the bank was not the cause of the plaintiffs injury. The court held
that for the reinvestigation requirement of section 1681i to be
triggered: "[t]he decisive inquiry is whether the defendant credit
bureau could have uncovered the inaccuracy" if it had reasonably
reinvestigated the matter.90 Because the plaintiffs dispute in
DeAndrade was actually a dispute with the bank over the validity of
the mortgage, the CRAs could not have uncovered the truth behind
the dispute through reasonable investigation. Therefore, the lack of
investigation or any breach of a duty imposed by FCRA was not the
cause of the harm. 91 This case demonstrates the First Circuit's
reluctance to impose liability on CRAs for unresolved disputes
between creditors and borrowers.
The First Circuit also refused to impose liability in Chiang v.
MBNA. 92 The court found that that case turned on the following
pertinent section of section 1681:
The Fair Credit Reporting Act imposes certain obligations
on entities that furnish credit information to consumer
credit reporting agencies (CRAs). One such obligation is to
investigate any disputes over the completeness or accuracy
of the information furnished and then notify the CRA of
any corrections-but only if the CRA, acting as a
gatekeeper, has previously notified the furnisher of the
consumer's dispute. By contrast, "[a] notice of disputed
information provided directly by the consumer to a
8 Id. at 64.
88 Id. at 64-65.
8

Id. at 65.

90 Id. at 68 (citing Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir.
1997)) (holding sections 1681n and 16810 of Title 15 respectively provide private
rights of action for willful and negligent noncompliance with any duty imposed by
the FCRA and allows recovery for actual damages and attorneys' fees and costs, as
well as punitive damages in the case of willful noncompliance).
91DeAndrade, 523 F.3d at 69.
92 Chiang v. MBNA, 620 F.3d 30 (1st
Cir. 2010).
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furnisher does not trigger a furnisher's duties under §
1681s-2(b)." 93
The plaintiff in the Chiang case disputed the alleged
delinquency report on payments on his credit card and claimed that
the CRA failed to follow up on that dispute with a further
investigation. 94 The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendant after finding no evidence that a CRA, rather than just the
plaintiff himself, had ever contacted the defendant concerning the
plaintiffs objections.9 5 The court in this case affirmed the rule set in
DeAndrade, and refused to impose liability for failure to investigate
when information given to the CRA comes from the subject of the
report and not a third party furnisher of credit information.
Second Circuit
In the Second Circuit, a mortgage lending company, Premium
Mortgage Corporation, brought suit against Equifax and the other two
major credit reporting agencies, TransUnion LLC and Experian
Information Solutions Inc, as well as a myriad of intermediary
resellers of consumer credit information, asserting nine state law
claims. 96 The suit stemmed from the defendants' purchasing of
aggregate credit reports of potential mortgagors from intermediate
resellers of consumer credit information, such as Credit Plus. 97 The
reseller, in turn, purchased individual credit reports from each of the
CRA defendants and bundled the information for use by lenders like
the plaintiff. In this case, the plaintiff asserted state law claims based
upon defendants' practice of permitting other lenders to purchase
prescreened consumer reports that contain trigger leads, which are
disclosures of information from the CRAs to the reseller of credit
information such as defendant Credit Plus. 98 According to the
plaintiff in that case, these trigger leads constituted its "proprietary
customer information" because "such information is not readily
known in the industry and it cannot be obtained except through
extraordinary effort." 9 The focus of this case in the Second Circuit
was the FCRA preemption on issues relating to state common law
Id. at 35 n.8 (citations omitted).
Id. at 31.
95 Id.
96 Premium Mortg. Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 2009).
97 id.
98 See id.
93
94

99 Id.
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crimes committed by the CRA defendants. 00 In the key element of its
opinion, the Second Circuit stated:
The operative provision of the FCRA for the purpose of
this analysis is 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(A), which states:
"[N]o requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the
laws of any State . . . with respect to any subject matter
regulated under . . . subsection (c) or (e) of section 1681b

of this title, relating to the prescreening of consumer reports
,,

101

The case stands for the proposition that FCRA preempts state
law causes of action with respect to reporting and prescreening of
credit reports. Though many of the circuits are silent as to whether
state law can control the issues in question, the limited case law
available relies on the operative language in FCRA to preempt state
law claims such as the ones in Premium.
Third Circuit
The Third Circuit views the sections of FCRA that impose
liability on CRAs in favor of plaintiffs much more leniently than the
First and Second Circuits. The Third Circuit has stated, "§§ 1681n 1681o of Title 15 respectively provide private rights of action for
willful and negligent noncompliance with any duty imposed by the
FCRA and allows recovery for actual damages and attorneys' fees
and costs, as well as punitive damages in the case of willful

noncompliance."1 02
In Cortez v. Trans Union LLC,10 3 the Third Circuit held that
section 1681i imposes a duty to reinvestigate any information in a
consumer's file that is disputed by a consumer and either record the
current status of the information in dispute or delete it.104 The Third
Circuit will impose liability should the CRAs have notice of a dispute
in the report and that such duty will give rise to a duty to reasonably
If the agency determines that the information is
investigate.'
or cannot be verified, it must delete or modify
incomplete,
inaccurate,
the information and notify the provider of the information that the
10 Id.

1o1 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(A) (2006)).
Cushman v. Trans Union, Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing
Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 962 (3d Cir. 1996)).
103 Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2010).
'0 Id. at 713.
102

105Id.

at 713-14.
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information has been modified or deleted from the consumer's file. 106
Fourth Circuit
In the conservative Fourth Circuit, FCRA litigation is
highlighted by the decision in Robinson v. Equifax Information
Services, LLC.10 7 In that matter, the plaintiff hired Equifax to help
her identify and correct errors in her credit report that resulted from a
stolen identity. 08 However, the plaintiff brought suit several years
after the initial reporting, due to errors and damages resulting from
Equifax's mishandling of the information.109 Equifax mistakenly
placed Robinson's address and social security number on three credit
files established by the identity thief, each of which contained
derogatory credit accounts (the "identity thief's files")." 0
Consequently, Equifax sent various creditors requesting Robinson's
credit report her actual credit file along with one of the identity
thief s files."' As a result of these errors, Robinson's credit problems
persisted and she experienced difficulties obtaining any type of
consumer credit from 2003 until 2006.112 For example, she had a
credit card application denied in part based on derogatory
information contained in one of the identity thief s files that Equifax
sent the credit card company."
In the Robinson case, the Fourth Circuit upheld the trial
court's finding that Equifax negligently reported Robinson's credit.
114 It also upheld the jury award of actual damages in the amount of
$200,000 for (1) loss of opportunity in the home mortgage market,
(2) emotional distress, and (3) loss of income from missing
approximately 300 hours of work addressing Equifax's mistakes.1 15
Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has stated, "Congress enacted the FCRA 'to
require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(A).
560 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 2009).
18 Id. at 237.

106

107

Id.at 23 8.
1"'12 Id.

Id.

113

114

Id.
Id. at 246.

us Id. at 240.
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for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel,
insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and
equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality,
accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information. . . .'
15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)."116 In following this view of fairness and
equity, the Fifth Circuit stated, "Congress further required that
consumer reporting agencies 'follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the
individual about whom' a credit report relates. 15 U.S.C. §
168le(b)."" 7
In Stevenson, the court went into a lengthy analysis as to what
would constitute negligence or willfulness in failing to correct or
accurately report credit information."' 8 The court held that allowing
previously deleted inaccurate information to be re-reported on a
credit report is negligent.' 19 The court held that TRW was negligent
in not making calls to verify the information or check its accuracy. 20
The court reached this decision with knowledge of the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Bryant v. TRW, in which the same credit reporting firm
was held liable for negligence in only making two follow-up calls to
check the accuracy of information.12 It is clear that the Fifth Circuit
imposes a high level of liability for failure to verify information and
this level of negligence justifies damages.
In Young v. Equifax the plaintiff, Young, alleged that the
CRA injured him by publishing defamatory information about him in
violation of the FCRA. Young claimed that an ex-girlfriend opened a
joint charge account in Young's name without his permission, the
CRA failed to acknowledge this information and Young disputed
these discrepancies with the CRA.122 Though the case turned on
whether Young had waived his rights under the FCRA through
previous settlements, the Fifth Circuit held that any private right of
action Young may have had under the FCRA would require proof
that a CRA had given the prospective lenders false information.123
116
117
11

Stevenson v. TRW, Inc., 987 F.2d 288, 292 (5th Cir. 1993).
Id.
See id. at 294.

see also Morris v. Credit Bureau of Cincinnati, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 962,
968 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
120 Id. at 295.
121 Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 79 (6th Cir.
1982).
122 Young v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 294 F.3d 631, 633-35 (5th Cir.
2002).
123 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) (cross-referencing
§1681i(a)(2) and
establishing duties of furnishers of information arising upon notice of a dispute).
119Id.;
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Young pointed to no evidence tending to prove that notice of a
dispute from a CRA was given as required to trigger duties under
section 1681s-2(b). Thus, Young's FCRA claims failed as a matter of
law. 124

Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit goes a step further than any case reviewed
from other Circuits and imposes liability on a CRA for the willful
actions of an employee under a theory of apparent authority. In Jones
v. FederatedFinancialReserve Corp., a friend of a jilted ex-spouse
of the plaintiff was employed at the defendant credit reporting
company and obtained a credit report on the plaintiff at the behest of
the ex-spouse.125 Obtaining a credit report from a CRA for a nonapproved, non-business purpose is in direct violation of the FCRA.126
According to the Sixth Circuit, these actions violate section 1681b's
extensive list of the limited circumstances under which a CRA or a
user of credit reports may furnish or utilize a consumer report. The
CRA, Federated, was required by the statute to comply with section
1681b's permissible uses and purposes when providing and using
consumer credit reports. 127 The court found that the scope of the
friend's employment was to obtain credit reports, and doing so, even
wrongfully, was well within that scope of employment. As such, the
defendant, through apparent authority over its employee, willfully
violated FCRA.
Jones v. FederatedFinancialReserve Corp., demonstrates an
extension of the doctrine articulated in the Fifth Circuit. Again, it
extends a heavy curtain of liability over CRAs that fail to either
follow up on reports or monitor the reasons it justifies accessing
information. This ruling can be viewed as an extension of Bryant v.
TRW into the realm of vicarious liability for the intentional and
illegal acts of its employees. 129 Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have
held CRAs to a high standard of accuracy and diligence.

124
125

1998).
126
127

Young, 294 F.3d at 540-41.
Jones v. Federated Financial Reserve Corp., 144 F.3d 961, 962-63 (6th Cir.
See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
Jones, 144 F.3d at 964.

128 d.
29Bryant

v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 79 (6th Cir. 1982).
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Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit faced a factually analogous case in
Washington v. Equifax Information Services, LLC130 as the Fourth
Circuit faced in the Robinson case. In Washington, the plaintiffs
identity was also stolen, causing him to solicit the services of Equifax
to rectify the resultant errors and report his credit information as it
existed prior to the theft.131 In 2008, he applied for a loan, but was
denied because of uncorrected inaccuracies in his credit report
resulting from the theft.132 The plaintiff sued Equifax, claiming that
the company violated the FCRA by disseminating false information
about his credit history and by failing to employ reasonable
procedures to investigate the accuracy of its information after he
reported the identity theft.133 He also claimed that his credit problems
caused his marriage to fail and left him suicidal and unable to
work. 134
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit held that the
plaintiff had not proven that the negligent or intentional acts of
Equifax had caused the damages that he claimed.135 Additionally, he
failed to adduce evidence showing that his Equifax report was
inaccurate, that they had notice of the inaccuracies, or that they failed
to correct such inaccuracies, all of which a cause of action under

FCRA requires.136
Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit does not typically extend liability as far as
the Fifth or Sixth Circuits for wrongful access to credit information
under the FCRA, aligning itself more with the Seventh Circuit in
refusal to find CRA liability.' 37
Washington v. Equifax Info. Srvs., LLC, 373 F. App'x 633 (7th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 683 (2010).
130

' Id. at 633.
132

Id.

13id.

134 Washington, 373 F. App'x at 633.
13 5Id. at 634.

Id; 15 U.S.C. § 168le(b); see also Wantz v. Experian Info. Solutions, 386
F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2004), abrogatedon other grounds by Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007); Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284
(7th Cir. 1994). .
137 See Poehl v. Countrywide Loans, Inc., 528 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 2008); cf
Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding release of
consumer information in connection with an offer for credit on the purchase of a
136
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In Poehl, the Eighth Circuit was called upon to define what
types of agencies and lenders could be allowed access to obtain and
disseminate credit information. Specifically, the court analyzed the
provision that permits creditors to purchase prescreened lists of
consumers who meet the creditor's specific criteria without the
consumers' consent as long as the purchaser intends to give the
consumer a "firm offer of credit."' 3 In this case, the defendants
mailed flyers, which stated that the plaintiffs had been pre-approved
for various home and car loans. The court held that the mailers fell
within the statutory definition of firm offers of credit, and that the
CRAs did not violate FCRA by accessing the laintiff's credit
information to extend firm offers of credit to them.' 3
In Gohman v. Equifax Information Services, Inc.,140 a district
court in Minnesota addressed the question of whether Equifax
violated FCRA negligently when it (1) delegated to CSC (an affiliate
CRA which owned and maintained the plaintiffs credit file) its duty
to update and review credit file changes; (2) failed to ensure that
changes were made to the credit file; and (3 failed to detect "gross
The court held that
inconsistencies" in plaintiffs credit file.
delegation of duties is not unreasonable and does not violate either
the CRA industry standard of care to credit furnishers or the
guidelines of FCRA.142 Additionally, the court held that Equifax
might not face liability if the plaintiff never filed a dispute with
Equifax. However, the court acknowledged evidence that the plaintiff
contacted Equifax concerning the erroneous information and was
referred to Wells Fargo. Plaintiff also presented evidence showing
that Wells Fargo sent Equifax a written notice that the deceased
status in her file needed to be changed. Plaintiff therefore
demonstrated that Equifax was on notice that her file contained a
significant inaccuracy, and that Equifax could be held liable for its

car with the possibility of interest rates varying from 3.0% to 24.9%, and no further
information on computation of such interest, was not a firm offer and therefore was
impermissible release under the CRA); Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Servs.,
Inc., 523 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the firm offer requirement
under 15 U.S.C 1681b(c)(1)(B)(i) does not require the offer to be valuable);
Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, NA, 369 F.3d 833, 841 (5th Cir. 2004)
(interpreting the firm offer requirement as used in the CRA to mean "a firm offer if
you meet certain criteria").
"' 15 U.S.C. §168lb(c)(1)(B)(i).
139 Poehl, 528 F.3d at 1099.
140 Gohman v. Equifax Info. Srys., LLC, 395 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D.
Minn. 2005).
141 Id. at 827.
142

id.
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failure to correct it. 143
Ninth Circuit
In a suit naming numerous CRAs for alleged wrongful and
erroneous reporting of information on a credit report, Nelson v.
Equifax Information Services, Inc.,144 the District Court for the
Central District of California held that CRAs violated the FCRA with
respect to the information released by the CRAs. In Nelson, the
plaintiff, Nelson, sued for alleged re-reporting of information that
was unverified and undisputedly false. 4 5 The court held that the
CRAs failed to exercise the requisite care and their acts constituted
negligence or even willful knowledge of an FCRA violation. 146 In
order to sustain her claims against defendant Arrow, Nelson had to
prove, both that she had notified Equifax of the disputed account, and
that Equifax had notified Arrow of the disputed account. According
to the evidence, Nelson notified Equifax of the disputed Account in
September 2005, but Equifax failed to send notice to Arrow of the
dispute. Therefore her claims were sustained against Equifax, but not
in respect to Arrow, the furnisher of the information. 147
Nelson, in its differing outcomes for Equifax and Arrow,
shows the willingness of the. Ninth Circuit to extend liability to
parties for their negligence or willfulness, but not when a plaintiff
fails to show that the party knew, or should have known, of the false
information. In Nelson, Arrow was not held to the duty of
investigation suggested by both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. Were the
Nelson facts presented in either the Fifth or Sixth Circuits, Arrow
could likely have been held liable for failure to undertake an
investigation into the accuracy of information received from the
furnisher. 148 However, in this instance, even amidst evidence that
Arrow should have been aware of a dispute, the Ninth Circuit did not
extend liability. 149
Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit has squarely focused the burden of proof on
143 id

v. Equifax Info. Srvs., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
Id. at 1233.
146 Id. at 1232.
147
Id. at 1231.
14 8
See Fifth Circuit and Sixth Circuit supra.
149 See Nelson, 522 F. Supp.
2d at 1233.
144Nelson
145
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the plaintiff in an action against a CRA. In Birmingham v. Experian
Info. Solutions, Inc.,150 Birmingham sued Experian and Verizon
alleging, inter alia, incorrect reporting and violations of FCRA.'5
The allegations stemmed from an incident with Verizon where
Birmingham disputed activity on both his actual accounts and on two
accounts fraudulently opened in his name. 152 The issue concerning
Experian was whether it "intentionally or recklessly failed to
investigate adequately his dispute with Verizon."l53 In discovery,
Experian produced a letter sent to Birmingham requesting appropriate
proof of his identit% and a copy of the report he filed regarding the
fraudulent activity. 54 Birmingham never adequately followed up on
this request. 5 5 Two Experian employees swore in affidavits that this
identity information is required before Experian will further
investigate the accuracy of the information.15 6 As a result, the court
found that Experian's "standard procedures appear reasonable." 5 7
The court concluded that a reasonable person evaluating the evidence
"could not find Experian to have committed a willful violation of the
FCRA." 5 8
Eleventh Circuit
In Cahlin v. General Motors Acceptance Corp, 1 the
plaintiff alleged negligent and willful noncompliance with various
provisions of FCRA. The 11th Circuit affirmed the District Court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of TRW, Inc. and CBI.160 The
claim stemmed from Cahlin's involvement in a dispute with General
Motors over his liability for lease payments after he returned the
vehicle prior to the end of the lease term. 16 1 He had the vehicle for
less than 90 days in 1985. He contended that the salesperson at the
dealership said he could return the vehicle without penalty if he did
Birmingham v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 633 F.3d 1006 (10th Cir.

1so

2011).
151
152

Id.
Id. at 1008.

153 Id.
154 Id. at

1011.
ss5Id.
156 Id. at 1012.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159

1991).16 0

Cahlin v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151 (1 th Cir.
Id.

"' Id. at 1154.
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so within 90 days.1 62 General Motors charged him with an early lease
termination penalty, and when he failed to pay that amount, it was
reported as a bad debt.' 63 After a period of negotiations, he agreed to
a partial payment of the amount demanded by General Motors.164 He
completed the payment of the negotiated amount to General Motors
by May 1986. 65 Cahlin alleged he was damaged because he was
denied credit on many occasions between October '9, 1986, and
November 3, 1987, namely the denial of a residential mortgage
loan.166 However, Cahlin produced no documentation that the denial
was the result of the TRW report.167 The court emphasized that it was
Cahlin's burden to prove that the credit report was the causal factor in
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed two
his credit denial.168
interpretations of what it means for a credit report to be accurate.169
The first view is called technically correct where the CRA satisfies its
duty if the report is factually correct, even if misleading or
incomplete.170 The second view is the maximum possible accuracy
where if the report is factually correct but possibly misleading, the
CRA cannot win on summary judgment.'71 While the district court
ruled using the technically accurate approach, the Eleventh Circuit
panel stated that it has yet to adopt either test and did not need to
reach that issue in this case because of the evidentiary failures of the
plaintiff. Furthermore, the court found that the reports contained
information believed to be factual by the credit reporting agency, and
that any derogatory remarks were an accurate reflection of how
General Motors initially characterized the account.172 The court
stated that "a consumer... cannot bring a section 611(a) claim against
a credit agency when it exercises its independent professional
judgment, based on full information, as to how a particular account
should be reported on a credit report." 73 The court editorialized that
consumers do not get to dictate to CRAs what information shall be
reported, as long as that information is accurate.
162
63

id.
Id. at 1154-55.

' Id.
' Id. at 1155.
166 id.
67

Id. at 1161.
id
69
1 Id. at 1157.
I
168

170id.

171 Id.
172
I3

Id. at 1160.
Id.
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Fifteen years later the 11th Circuit decided Enwonwu v.
Trans Union, LLC, et al.' 4 Enwonwu alleged that Trans Union and
numerous other defendants violated the FCRA.175 He claimed that
Trans Union did so by failing to take reasonable steps in confirming
the accuracy of information it published in his credit report and by
maintaining the entry after it was disputed, a. violation of section
1681e(b) of the FCRA.' 76 Specifically, he claimed Equifax violated
the FCRA by publishing inaccurate information about a 2002
garnishment.' 7 The district court dismissed claims against all
defendants except Trans Union.178 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Trans Union on his 1618e(b) claim
because although the report contained an error, Enwonwu failed to
produce evidence that the Trans Union report caused him harm.' 7 9
The only evidence he offered, besides his own allegations, was a
general letter from Trans Union stating that creditors use credit
reports to evaluate creditworthiness and that his report had been
requested. 80 The district court stated that Enwonwu was entitled to
an inference that the credit report was examined by a potential
creditor, but that the proffered evidence did not support an inference
that the credit report was the cause of the credit denial.' 8 '
Additionally, he failed to present evidence that the other negative
entries were inaccurate or that his lending result would have been
different without the Trans Union error. The 11th Circuit affirmed the
summary judgment for Trans Union and the dismissal of the claims
against the other defendants.' 82 While both the district and appeals
courts were clear on their interpretation of CRA obligations under
FCRA, this case is a questionable precedent due to what appears to
have been Enwonwu's pro se pursuit of the case. The report is replete
with problems that typically haunt pro se claimants, especially in
cases at this level of complexity.
In Jackson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC.,s 3 the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Equifax.184 Jackson,
Enwonwu v. Trans Union, LLC, 164 Fed. App'x 914 (11th Cir. 2006).
"sId. at 916.
16
1 Id. at 917.
174

17

Id..at 916.

78

Id. at 917.
Id. at 918.

1

'7

180 Id.

181Id.
182 Id.
183

184

Jackson v. Equifax Info. Srys., LLC, 167 Fed. App'x 144 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 147.
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proceeding pro se, claimed denial of credit due to inaccurate
information in his credit report.18 5 Jackson attempted to offer a credit
report compiled by Equifax and two credit denials from Impac
Lending as evidence to the appeals court.186 However, the denial
letters had not been introduced in the district court, so they could not
be considered by the Eleventh Circuit panel.18 7 From the evidence on
the record, which was a copy of the credit report, a copy of a merge
credit report, and interrogatories, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the
district court did not commit an error in granting Equifax's motion
for summary judgment.'
This followed the previous Eleventh
Circuit decisions by holding that Jackson had not produced evidence
that he was damaged by the inaccurate report. 18 The appeals court
also stated, as it has in previous cases, that credit report inaccuracies
are not a case for "strict liability" and that the CRA can escape
liability if it shows that the inaccurate report was generated through
reasonable procedures.' 90
In Green v. RBS Nat. Bank,191 Green brought action against
multiple banks alleging that they provided false information to Trans
Union and Experian.19 The appeals court stated that the district court
was correct in finding the FRCA did not provide for private right of
action to redress misstatements by creditors.1 93 However, there is a
private right of action for a violation of section 1681s-2(b), but only
if the furnisher received a notice of the consumer's dispute from a
CRA.194 Furthermore, the court concluded that even under that claim,
Green would have lost, because the banks investigated the disputes
with both Experian and Trans Union in a timely manner.195
More recently, the Eleventh Circuit decided Ray v. Equifax
Info Servs., LLC. 196 Ray, yet another pro se plaintiff, alleged, inter
alia, violations of the FCRA by Equifax. In this case, the district
court granted summary judgment to Equifax because Ray failed to
produce the credit report relied on in denying him credit, and he also

18
186

Id. at 145.
d

187Id.
18

Id. at 146.

189Id.

1o Id.
19' Green v. RBS Nat. Bank, 288 Fed. App'x 641 (11th Cir. 2008).
192 Id. at 642.
193

id.

194

id

'9s Id. at 643.
196

Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 327 Fed. App'x 819 (1Ith Cir. 2009).
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failed to show that the report was the cause of his failure to obtain
credit. The appeals court upheld the summary judgment ruling.197 In
reaching its decision on the FCRA claims, the Eleventh Circuit
referenced in a footnote its technically-correct vs. maximumpossible-accuracy analysis in Cahlin.19 8 Parallel to Cahlin, the district
court in Ray granted summary judgment using the technically correct
approach, but the appeals court noted that it has not adopted either
analysis and did not need to reach that issue in this case, again due to
the failure of the plaintiff to meet its burden of proof.199
Continuing to follow the precedent in this circuit in another
2009 ruling against a pro se plaintiff, Peart v. Shippie,2 00 the appeals
court affirmed dismissal of Peart's claim of FCRA violations by
Wells Fargo, Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union on the grounds that
he failed to state a claim. ' The district court found that Peart did not
allege that Wells Fargo failed to investigate the dispute or that
Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union failed to reinvestigate his credit
history or to- generally follow reasonable credit reporting
procedures.202 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit yet again found that
the claims presented by the pro se plaintiff did not raise sufficient
issues to avoid summary judgment.2 0
A question that arises at this juncture is whether the Eleventh
Circuit strongly leans toward the CRAs, or if they have simply been
confronted with a series of poorly presented cases brought by pro se
plaintiffs? A possible explanation is that the Eleventh Circuit has
historically been hostile to such plaintiff claims and therefore, the
plaintiff bar members are unwilling to pursue these cases on a
contingency basis in this circuit. Thus, pushing the aggrieved
individuals into pursuing cases pro se.

IV. CONCLUSION
This article began with an examination of the development of
the statutory framework for legal liability for credit reporting
agencies. Traced back to English common law theories, the statutes
in the United States, as interpreted by the Federal Courts, make it the
'97 Id. at 826.
198Cahlin v.

General Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir.

1991).
Ray, 327 Fed. App'x at 826.
Peart v. Shippie, 345 Fed. App'x 384 (11th Cir. 2009).
201 Id. at 386.
202 id
203 id
'99

200
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responsibility of CRAs to report accurate financial consumer data in
credit reporting practices and provide the basis for holding them
accountable should they fail to do so. In the age of identity theft and
advancing technologies giving rise to increasing methods for
"hacking" into databases, these statutes are important for consumers.
Recent amendments to FCRA and the passage of FACT Act have
provided stronger statutory protections for ensuring the accuracy and
security of consumers' credit reports. These include: providing the
consumer easier access to and more control over the data within their
credit reports and the ability to monitor them for accuracy, requiring
disclosure to the consumer when their credit reports are being
requested, and mandating more frequent disclosure to the consumer
of their credit scores. These statutory requirements have provided the
basis for judicial decisions from the courts as the result of consumer
challenges to the accuracy and security of their financial data, and
when and to whom it is disclosed.
The Federal court decisions, examining them by their
respective Circuit Court of Appeals, have generally trended in the
direction of more consumer protection. This is not universally true
and practitioners need to be diligent in understanding the
requirements for finding liability in each Circuit where a case may be
brought.
The analysis produced some surprises in that the traditionally
"conservative" Fourth and Fifth Circuits have delivered decisions that
are more "pro-consumer" than Circuits like the First and Second,
which are not viewed by legal observers as being as conservative.
The Eleventh Circuit, formerly part of the Fifth Circuit, might be
viewed as predictably ruling in the "conservative" or pro-business
vein. As noted above, this is open to debate since numerous rulings
against plaintiffs are against pro se plaintiffs and not leading plaintiff
law firms.
Regardless of whether plaintiff consumers or defendant CRAs
prevail, the next decade portends an expansion of CRA litigation in
the Federal courts in light of the continued troubled economic climate
and the shifting view of liability by the courts. This suggests that the
parameters of consumer rights and protection and CRA liability will
continue to unfold in the coming years. This review is but a signpost
along the way.

